Why this book:  I lead a volunteer reading group for young men who are early in the pipeline to become SEALs or SWCCs (Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewmen).  We selected this book to read and discuss as it addresses tactical and leadership challenges that are key to the profession they are entering.

Summary in 3 Sentences: The book is focused on the ethical challenges of ground combat forces fighting insurgents on today’s battlefields.  He provides background on how the training institutions of the USMC, US Army, and Special Operations  ground forces train and prepare their forces for these challenges, and offers advice and perspective on what training methodologies seem to work best, and what is ineffective.  He finally gives advice to tactical ground force commanders – at the platoon and company level – on how best to create and sustain a climate in their units that respects their moral and legal obligations to minimize non-combatant casualties, and to respect the human rights of enemy prisoners, wounded, and/or those suspected of supporting them.

My Impressions:  A Tactical Ethic is a short book (110 pages) and serves as a primer on ethics on the battlefield, why it is important to fight ethically, not only because it’s the right thing to do, but especially in counter-insurgency, it makes sense.   Dick Couch outlines the challenges our military leaders face in training soldiers to respect their ethical and legal obligations when fighting an insurgent enemy who does not follow such rules.   Many of these challenges are perennial in the mindsets of soldiers in any conflict in any generation, but they are particularly challenging given that the US has committed to adhering as closely as possible to the traditional Laws of Armed Conflict, as codified in the Geneva Conventions.  Dick Couch faced these challenges as a leader of a SEAL platoon in Vietnam, but he also considers how today’s environment is a somewhat  different, given that our young warriors have grown up with different influences, in a different era, with different and more lethal tools at their disposal, and indeed, every insurgency is different.

The preface to the book is an attention getter. In it Couch explains how and why he decided to write this book, after hearing disturbing stories from returning warriors. Many had expressed concerns about how what they’d seen, witnessed, even participated in, didn’t match what they understood were the values they were fighting for.  So he chose to explore what causes (mostly young) men to violate the standards, what are our military institutions doing to prepare them for the ethical challenges on the battlefield, and how can tactical leaders create units that will choose to adhere to these ethical standards.

He makes clear that particularly in counter-insurgency –the type of war we are fighting in Afghanistan, Iraq, and in parts of Africa –  the “human terrain” is most important, and HOW we fight is key to winning, or at least not worsening our reputation with the local population. He introduces the “prudential” argument for protecting non-combatants:  Apart from being “the right thing to do,”  it is more effective than excessive violence in fulfilling our strategic aims in a counter-insurgency.

In chapter one,  Dick Couch identifies a challenge he returns to again and again in the book – the rogues, or what he calls “pirates,” to be found in many ground force units who have an agenda and propensity for violence that is inconsistent with the values of the military.  These pirates are often some of the most tactically proficient operators in their units, which often gives them significant influence on the attitudes of their squad/platoon/company mates, and they can have a deleterious effect on the values of their fighting unit.

He introduces a dilemma he’ll repeatedly address:  “What worries me is the number of those who are willing to tolerate wrong-doing in their presence.” He points out that lists of values, ethos statements, and creed documents are useless unless they become part of the culture at the place where our forces confront the enemy.   He emphasizes that it is at the platoon and the company level where our ground forces confront the enemy, where they are usually out of sight of senior commanders, and where troops have the greatest opportunity to comply with our nation’s values, or disregard our values and kill unnecessarily, or mistreat non-combatants, prisoners, wounded, or others.   And it is the training, education and acculturation of warriors at this level in combat that Couch focuses on.

He points out how each operational unit has its own very powerful and compelling mini-culture which is influenced by a number of factors.  If in the mini-culture of a platoon or company, it becomes acceptable to cross the line of proper conduct,  most young men will seek to fit in, and will not protest egregious conduct  – because of their strong need to be part of the group.  The value of unit cohesion and loyalty is very strong – but it can have its down sides.

In his chapter “Toward an effective Tactical Ethos,” he confronts the issue of conflicting loyalties – the challenge of having to choose between loyalty to principle and one’s values, or loyalty to the group.  In the best combat forces, the value of  unit cohesion and loyalty is VERY powerful and hard for young men to overcome when they witness behavior that is immoral.  He returns to the negative influence  “pirates” can have on a unit’s culture.  He offers advice and guidance to leaders in how to manage pirates, and keep company/platoon mini-culture on the right side of the divide between ethical and non-ethical conduct.

He asks, “So how do we provide ongoing moral conditioning for our warriors without returning to boot-camp-style lectures on ethics or mandatory discussion groups on a break during a forced conditioning march?”  He argues that classroom and lecture settings are not effective; rather moral conditioning should be integrated into professional, physical and tactical training. And it “must be carefully nuanced” if it is to overcome what he identifies as the three most insidious influences on the moral behavior of troops at war:   boredom, the desire for revenge, and misplaced loyalty.  He outlines some steps that Duane Dieter’s Close Quarters Defense program had implemented with the SEALs, and how the USMC has integrated the concepts and lessons of “warriorship” into so much of what they do.

In the final chapter “Battlefield ROE’s” he states, “One thing is certain: each of these deployment-bound ground-combat compoenents, especially the squads and platoons are mini-cultures.”  He offers 10 suggestions for ROEs – “Rules of Ethics” (playing on the standard meaning of ROE – “Rules of Engagement”) for ground combat leaders in shaping their unit’s mini-culture.  He goes into some detail with each of these, but I offer a very brief summary of his points:

1. The Expectation Rule. Small unit leaders need to communicate on a recurring basis what is expected regarding good and acceptable conduct.
2. The Proximity Rule: What a combat leader tolerates in his presence is critical.
3. The Battle Buddy Rule: Nearly every one of us needs someone close at hand who can serve as a confidant and sounding board and to watch our backs – physically and morally.
4. The Alcohol Tolerance Rule. Leaders make sure that excess in alcohol is not tolerated, nor are any incidents where alcohol is involve.
5. The Alcohol Tolerance Rule in the battlespace. There is no drinking in the battlespace. And the cultural practices of the host country must be respected.
6. The Boredom Rule. Much of war is waiting – slow and boring – and leaders can’t let the pentup energy become destructive to the morale or the integrity of the unit.
7. The Recognition Rule. The emergence of strong natural leaders in a combat unit can be positive. Leaders must reward and recognize those who stand up and do the right thing under pressure – to validate positive behavior and help neutralize negative behavior.
8. The Intolerance Rule. Excommunicate those who repeatedly or egregiously demonstrate bad conduct or a bad influence. Make the statement – it will NOT be tolerated.
9. The loyalty Rule.  Recognizing how important loyalty is in a combat unit, it cannot supersede honor.  Loyalty above all else, except honor.
10. The Righteous Rule.  Anyone who deviates from the standards of right moral conduct will be summarily removed from the unit, and will be sent home in shame.

A possible shortcoming in the book:  I felt he needed more specific cases and real-life examples to better make his points.  He addresses the effectiveness of training programs designed to inspire moral conduct in combat and makes reasonable arguments for making the training more effective.   A few specific examples or case studies of these principles at work (or not) would have improved the book.  The other key point was the difficulty of ethical decision making in combat – when leaders and soldiers under stress are making decisions that require weighing risk to troops and mission against risk to non-combatants.  These are ALWAYS tough calls.  The book would have been better had he provided a few case studies in which a leader, or a soldier made the right or less-right call in those gray areas where Rule of Engagement may permit actions which are not necessarily the most moral.

How my session went with the young men preparing to become SEALs:

I began with a few big-picture points about this book:

• This book may not help them tactically get thru SEAL training, but it should reinforce to them that the rigorous rite-of-passage they are going thru is to enter an honorable profession.  Honor is paramount – not just at home but on the battlefield.
• They are part of a much larger effort in the American military to shape the character and battlefield behavior of combat forces.  SEAL training is just one piece of that. Other services have their own versions which are very good.
• It also addresses how our warriors fit into the general culture of America and what America expects of them.

We had a senior SEAL officer join our discussion, who had extensive experience fighting and commanding forces in the recent counter-insurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. He shared that the SEAL training pipeline has come a long way in the last decade in positively integrating moral conditioning into pre-deployment exercises and scenario training, but agreed it needs constant attention.

He emphasized his agreement with Couch that positive Senior Enlisted leadership is key to creating a positive culture in a combat unit.  He also pointed out that in his experience, the level of ethical focus is different when fighting for one’s life in an intense   fire fight, than when one is not under any immediate threat, but it always needs to be there.  He noted that there were several details in how Couch made his points that didn’t fit with his experience, but he agreed whole-heartedly with the intent and main themes of the book, to understand, address, and improve the moral awareness and behavior of our combat forces.

Most of the young SEAL candidates had been exposed to the concepts in A Tactical Ethic in their officer training – at the Naval Academy, NROTC, or Officer Candidate School.  But all said that whereas previously it had been a check-in-the-box academic subject, now that they were about to enter a profession in which these challenges would soon be real, the subject mater of this book had a lot more meaning to them.  I sense (hope) that having a couple of senior SEAL officers stress the importance of honor on the battlefield in this session, will help them better stand up to the pirates in their platoons once they enter the force.